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Abstract
The incentive ratio measures the utility gains from strategic behaviour.
Without any restrictions on the setup, ratios for linear, Leontief and
Cobb–Douglas exchange markets are unbounded, showing that manipulat-
ing the equilibrium is a worthwhile endeavour, even if it is computationally
challenging. Such unbounded improvements can be achieved even if agents
only misreport their utility functions. This provides a sharp contrast with
previous results from Fisher markets. When the Cobb–Douglas setup is
more restrictive, the maximum utility gain is bounded by the number of
commodities. By means of an example, we show that it is possible to
exceed a known upper bound for Fisher markets in exchange economies.
Keywords: incentive ratio, competitive equilibrium, equilibrium manipu-
lation, utility function, exchange economy
1 Introduction
General equilibrium theory and (noncooperative) game theory are among the
most succesful and well-studied areas in economic theory. The former seeks to
explain the existence of equilibria in multiple markets at the same time. The
latter serves as the primary tool for predicting, analysing and describing the
behaviour of rational agents’ actions both in and out of equilibrium.
Both branches have yielded an abundance of literature and served as the
basis of much fruitful research. In this paper, we try to combine the two ap-
proaches for exchange economies. Specifically, we ask how much any individual
agent can gain from strategically misreporting some of his/her utility function.
The primary tool for this will be the incentive ratio as introduced by [7], [6].
In a nutshell, when all agents report truthfully, an equilibrium will materialise,
∗I am grateful to Xiaohui Bei and Satoru Takahashi for discussions on the topic and many
useful suggestions and comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. All remaining errors
are of course my own.
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assigning all agents an equilibrium bundle. But given the endowments and
utility functions of the other agents, a strategic agent may be better off by
misreporting his/her own characteristics, thereby enforcing another equilibrium
and, therefore, potentially obtaining a better equilibrium bundle. The incentive
ratio tries to capture the maximal magnitude of such gains over all envisionable
setups. A formal definition will follow below. The results presented here suggest
that, contrary to previous findings in Fisher markets, the gains from strategic
behaviour may be significant, even allowing an agent to improve his equilibrium
utility without bound. If we impose the (common) restriction that all agents
possess at least a little bit of every commodity and the market is strongly com-
petitive, the utility gain in Cobb–Douglas markets is bounded by the number of
commodities, but it may exceed the upper bound from Fisher markets, which
we show by means of an example. The results obtained show a sharp contrast
with the findings in [7], [6]: in the Fisher market setup, incentive ratios are
bounded by the small constants 2, 2 and e1/e ≈ 1.44 for linear, Leontief and
Cobb–Douglas markets, respectively.
Related work
In [4], price of anarchy bounds are computed for linear, Leontief and Cobb–
Douglas markets in the Fisher model. That is, the ratio between (utilitarian)
welfare of all agents in the worst possible pure Nash equilibrium (for which ex-
istence is proven) and maximum welfare. It primarily differs from the analysis
presented here in that it focuses on welfare of all agents rather than measuring
the benefits of strategic behaviour for one specific agent. As in this paper, the
strategic variable of interest is the utility function. Arguably, misreporting the
utility function i.e. one’s preferences, is easier than misreporting (physical) en-
dowments, which can, at least in theory, be inspected and whose withholding
may be difficult and costly (e.g. due to storage costs). It is known that the
Walrasian mechanism is susceptible to manipulation via endowments: via with-
holding endowments and recovering it fully [11], recovering part of it [13] (see
also [14]) and even destroying part of one’s initial endowment [2]. However, the
aforementioned studies are qualitative, that is, they show that manipulation of
the equilibrium mechanism is possible, but do not quantify it. The incentive
ratio is a first step to quantifying the possible gains of misreporting in exchange
economies. It is not so difficult to see from Proposition 1 below that even when
destroying part of one’s initial endowment (in the case ei is the strategic variable
of interest), the incentive ratio may still tend to infinity.
The idea that an agent may act strategically in a (Fisher) market by mis-
reporting his/her utility function in order to get a better equilibrium bundle,
compared to the scenario where everyone is truthful, was already considered in
[1] for the case of linear utility functions. In this paper, Nash equilibria and
the relation with conflict-freeness (meaning that every agent can get an optimal
equilibrium bundle given the strategy profile) is studied. It is shown that being
conflict-free is a necessary condition for a Nash equilibrium, and for a symmet-
ric strategy profile it is also sufficient. The incentive ratio was first coined in
[7], where the strategic variable of interest is the (Leontief) utility function of a
player and bidding the true budget is a dominant strategy. In [6], [5], a slightly
more sophisticated version of the incentive ratio is presented, in which players
may also strategise on their endowments. The “exchange market game” is in-
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troduced in [10], and agents have linear utility functions. They may lie about
their utility function to manipulate the outcome of the exchange process. It is
consequently shown that a symmetric strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if
and only if it is conflict-free. Several properties of the symmetric Nash equi-
libria (e.g. Pareto-optimal payoffs, a characterisation for its uniqueness) are
subsequently derived.
Organisation
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the necessary
machinery, definitions and introduces some notation. Next, Section 3 presents
the results for incentive ratios in Linear, Leontief and Cobb–Douglas exchange
economies. The latter receives most attention. It is shown that, even if the
strategy space is restricted to the utility function only, all three incentive ratios
are unbounded. Under some specific, common assumptions, the e1/e bound is
recovered for Cobb–Douglas markets with 2 commodities. For the case where
there are at least 3 commodities, the incentive ratio is shown to be greater
than e1/e but bounded by the number of commodities. Finally, 4 concludes and
provides some directions for future research.
2 Preliminaries, exchange economies and com-
petitive equilibrium
We use the following notation. Suppose x, y ∈ Rn. Then x · y = ∑nk=1 xkyk
denotes the dot product of x and y. x ≤ y means xk ≤ yk for k = 1, . . . , n. For a
vector u = (u1, . . . , un), by u−i we mean the vector (u1, . . . , ui−1, ui+1, . . . , un)
(i.e. all entries except the i-th). For positive integer n, we use [n] as shorthand
notation for the set {1, . . . , n}. Im is the m×m identity matrix. The transpose
of a matrix M is denoted by MT and its determinant by |M |. If f : Rm → Rn,
then Df(x) represents the Jacobian matrix of f at x.
Depending on agents’ endowments we speak either of Fisher markets [3]
(in case of monetary endowments) or, more generally, in case of (a vector of)
commodity endowments, of exchange economies. In the former case, all agents
bring a certain amount of cash to the market and budgets are exogeneous to
the model, whereas in the latter the value of the endowment is endogeneous,
determined by market prices. That is, in exchange economies, each agent i is
endowed with a bundle of commodities ei ∈ Rm+ , whereas in the case of Fisher
markets, he simply possesses an amount of wealth wi ∈ R+. We will focus on the
more general model of exchange economies with n agents and m commodities.
Definition 1 (Exchange economy). An exchange economy (henceforth also sim-
ply referred to as economy) is a tuple ξ = ((ui)
n
i=1, (ei)
n
i=1), where
ui : R
m
+ → R is the utility function of agent i ∈ [n] and ei ∈ Rm+ is a vector
where eij indicates how much agent i ∈ [n] possesses of commodity j ∈ [m].
In an economy, agents interact with each other to obtain a bundle xi ∈ Rm+
by trading commodities given a price vector p ∈ Rm. If p is such a price vector,
then every agent solves the following consumer problem (CP).
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Definition 2 (Demand).
maximize ui(xi)
subject to p · xi ≤ p · ei
xi ≥ 0
(CP)
We call the set of solutions to problem (CP) the demand of agent i (at prices
p).
We can write xi(p, p · ei) to show explicitly that demand depends on en-
dowments and prices. Since prices are in turn determined by endowments and
utility functions, we may also write xi(ui, u−i, e) or, when it is understood that
u−i and e are fixed, simply as xi(ui). The cental topic in this study is the notion
of equilibrium, specifically, that of Walrasian or competitive equilibrium.
Definition 3 (Competitive/Walrasian equilibrium). A competitive equilibrium
is a pair (p, x) ∈ Rm × (Rm+ )n such that:
1. For all j ∈ [m],∑ni=1 xij =∑ni=1 eij i.e. markets clear
2. For all i ∈ [n], xi is a solution to (CP), i.e. xi is the best bundle among
the possible choices in the budget set.
2.1 Definition of the incentive ratio and illustration in lin-
ear markets
Every agent is characterized by two parameters, his endowment ei and his utility
function ui. Generally, different endowments and different utility functions will
lead to different equilibria. What if an agent purposely misreports his utility
function, thereby trying to get a better equilibrium allocation?
The incentive ratio is a concept introduced in [7]. It attempts to measure the
(maximum) benefits of manipulating the equilibrium mechanism by strategically
misreporting personal parameters. Formally, we define it as follows (adapted
for exchange economies, the original definition was given for Fisher markets in
[5], [7], [6]):
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Definition 4 (Incentive ratio). The incentive ratio of agent i in a market M
(e.g. linear, Cobb–Douglas or Leontief), denoted ζMi , is defined as:
ζMi = max
u−i∈U−i,e−i∈(Rm+ )
n−1
max
u′
i
∈Ui
maxx′∈E(u′
i
) ui(x
′
i(u
′
i, u−i, e))
minx∈E(ui) ui(xi(ui, u−i, e))
The incentive ratio of the market M is subsequently defined as
ζM = max
i∈[n]
ζMi
Remark 1. In this definition:
• Variables with a prime (′) refer to the scenario in which agent i misreports
his parameters (and all other agents report truthfully). That is, he reports
u′i and as a result, obtains a bundle x
′
i(u
′
i). Notice that this bundle is
evaluated by the true utility function.
• Given that player i reports u˜i (i.e. truthful or not) as his utility function
(and the other players u−i), we denote by E(u˜i) the set of equilibrium
allocations, that is,
E(u˜i) = {x ∈ (Rm+ )n| ∃p ∈ Rm+ (p, x) is a Walras equilibrium}.
under some (mild) assumptions this set is nonempty, but it could contain
multiple equilibrium allocations.
• Ui contains the admissible strategies/utility functions for player i, includ-
ing the one that agent he chooses when he misreports his utility function.
We denote U−i =
∏
k 6=i Uk. We will only consider the case where all Uk’s
are equal to a common U , thus U−i = U
n−1.
• From the preceding arguments, we may restrict attention to agent i, since
all agents can be treated symmetrically, thus we may rewrite the incentive
ratio for the market M as
ζM = max
u−i∈Un−1,e−i∈(Rm+ )
n−1
max
u′
i
∈U
maxx′∈E(u′
i
) ui(x
′
i(u
′
i, u−i, e))
minx∈E(ui) ui(xi(ui, u−i, e))
Example 1. The following example for linear markets shows that the conse-
quences for the incentive ratio stemming from the nonuniqueness of equilibrium
can be large. Here, the strategic influence of an agent is perhaps less relevant
than the equilibrium selection problem that is embodied in the definition of the
incentive ratio: the truthful equilibrium could be very bad for an agent (yielding
low utility) while the nontruthful equilibrium could be very good for him (yielding
high utility).
Setup: e1 = (ǫ, 1− ǫ), e2 = (1 − ǫ, ǫ), u2(x2) ≡ 0, ǫ > 0 and small
Truthful Nontruthful
u1(x1) = x11 u
′
1(x
′
1) = x
′
11
p = (1, 0) p′ = (1, 1)
x1 = (ǫ, 1− ǫ), x2 = (1 − ǫ, ǫ) x′1 = (1, 0), x′2 = (0, 1)
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We have
u1(x
′
1)
u1(x1)
=
1
ǫ
Letting ǫ tend to 0, the incentive ratio tends to ∞.
Although arguably the utility function for agent 2 is not very realistic, he
doesn’t care about any of the products on the market, it does not seem that such
a scenario was ruled out by the authors in [6]. In fact, in [7], [6], the following
markets are considered, with arbitrarily many agents and commodities:
1. Linear, i.e. U is the set of utility functions of the form u(x) = α · x where
α ∈ Rm+ .
2. Leontief, i.e. U is the set of utility functions of the form u(x) = minj∈[m]{xj/αj}
where α ∈ Rm++
3. Cobb–Douglas, i.e. U is the set of utility functions of the form u(x) =∏m
j=1 x
αj
j where 0 ≤ αj ≤ 1 for all j ∈ [m] and
∑m
j=1 αj = 1, so that U is
the set of Cobb–Douglas functions that are homogeneous of degree 1.
The (tight) bounds proven in [7], [6] for Fisher markets are 2, 2 and e1/e for
linear, Leontief and Cobb–Douglas respectively.
3 The incentive ratio in Leontief and Cobb–Douglas
markets
We will, without loss of generality, restrict ourselves to scenarios where ei ∈
[0, 1]m for all i ∈ [n] and ∑ni=1 eij = 1 for all j ∈ [m]. The results indicate
that, without any further restrictions on the setup presented in [7], [6] incentive
ratios in Leontief and Cobb–Douglas exchange economies are unbounded.
Proposition 1. The incentive ratio for Leontief and Cobb–Douglas exchange
economies equals +∞ (i.e. ∀n ∈ N there exists a market such that the incentive
ratio for player i is at least n).
Proof. (Leontief). e1 = (1− ǫ, ǫ), e2 = (ǫ, 1− ǫ), u2(x2) = min{x21, x22}, ǫ > 0
and small
Truthful Nontruthful
u1(x1) = min{x11, x12} u′1(x′1) = min{x′11, x′12}
then then
p = (δ, 1) p′ = (1, 1)
x1 = ((ǫ + δ − δǫ)/(1 + δ), (ǫ + δ − δǫ)/(1 + δ)) x′1 = (1/2, 1/2)
x2 = (1 − ǫ+ δǫ)/(1 + δ), (1− ǫ+ δǫ)/(1 + δ)) x′2 = (1/2, 1/2)
We have
u1(x
′
1)
u1(x1)
=
1 + δ
2(ǫ+ δ − δǫ)
Letting δ, ǫ tend to 0, the incentive ratio tends to ∞.
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Proof. (Cobb–Douglas). e1 = (1, 0), e2 = (0, 1), u2(x2) = x
ǫ
21x
(1−ǫ)
22 , ǫ > 0 and
small
Truthful Nontruthful
u1(x1) = x
.5
11x
.5
12 u
′
1(x
′
1) = x
′
11
then then
p = (1, 1/(2ǫ)) p′ = (1, 0)
x1 = (1/2, ǫ) x
′
1 = (1, 1)
x2 = (1/2, 1− ǫ) x′2 = (0, 0)
We have
u1(x
′
1)
u1(x1)
=
√
2ǫ−1
Letting ǫ tend to 0, the incentive ratio tends to ∞.
The intuition behind the proof for Cobb–Douglas markets is that it is pos-
sible for player 1 to completely annihilate the equilibrium value of player 2’s
endowment. Since u2(e2) = 0, the bundle x2 = (0, 0) solves the consumer prob-
lem (CP), since the indifference curve u2(x2) = 0 is odd-shaped compared to
the other indifference curves.
We make the following assumption to ensure all equilibrium prices are posi-
tive; this is rather standard in algorithmic game theory.1
Assumption 1. • (Positivity of endowments) Every agent possesses a strictly
positive amount of every commodity: ∀i ∈ [n], ∀j ∈ [m] eij > 0;
• (Strong competitiveness (see e.g. [4])) Every commodity is demanded by
at least one agent: ∀j ∈ [m] ∃i ∈ [n] αij > 0, ∀j ∈ [m] ∃i ∈ [n] α′ij > 0
This entails that the economy excess demand function
z(p) :=
n∑
i=1
(xi(p, p · ei)− ei) =
n∑
i=1
xi(p, p · ei)− 1
has the gross substitute property and this implies that the equilibrium price
is unique (see e.g. [9]).
For Cobb–Douglas markets with 2 commodities, the incentive ratio is e1/e i.e.
as in the Fisher market scenario. Here, we rule out a setup in which there exists
an agent that owns all of a certain commodity (as was the case in the above
example), an assumption that is not unusual. The result is easily extended to
an arbitrary number of agents. We present here the case n = 2.
Proposition 2. Consider a Cobb–Douglas economy with n = 2 players and
m = 2 commodities, in which both players hold a strictly positive amount of
both commodities. The incentive ratio is e1/e and this bound is tight.
Proof. First consider such an exchange economy in its most general form:
• Endowments: e1 = (e11, e12), e2 = (1− e11, 1− e12), (e11, e12) ∈ (0, 1)2
1Alternatively, we could assume the existence of a nonmanipulating agent who possesses
at least a little bit of all commodities and who desires every commodity.
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• Utility functions: u1(x11, x12) = x11αx121−α, u′1(x′11, x′12) = x′11α
′
x′12
1−α′
and u2(x21, x22) = x21
βx22
1−β ; α, α′, β ∈ (0, 1).
Notice that, here both agents have a little bit of both commodities so we
can not be in the situation of the example above. Normalize p1 = 1. Then
the value of agent 1’s endowment is p · e1 = e11 + e12p2 and the value of agent
2’s endowment is p · e2 = 1 − e11 + (1 − e12)p2. Demands follow from the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions as per usual:

x11 = αe11 + αe12p2
x12 = (1− α)e11/p2 + (1− α)e12
x21 = β(1− e11) + β(1 − e12)p2
x22 = (1− β)(1 − e11)/p2 + (1 − β)(1− e12)
We can solve for p2 and we find that:
p2 =
1− αe11 − β(1 − e11)
αe12 + β(1 − e12)
Therefore
x11 =
α[(1− β)e12 + βe11]
αe12 + βe22
and x12 =
(1 − α)[(1 − β)e12 + βe11]
1− αe11 − βe21
Now we can find a closed form expression for the incentive ratio as follows:
u1(x
′
1)
u1(x1)
=
(
α′[αe12 + βe22]
α[α′e12 + βe22]
)α(
(1 − α′)[1 − αe11 − βe21]
(1 − α)[1− α′e11 − βe21]
)1−α
=: T1
αT2
1−α
The following facts are easily verified:
1. α′ ≥ α⇒ T1 ≤ α′/α
2. α′ < α⇒ T1 < 1
3. α′ ≥ α⇒ T2 ≤ 1
4. α′ < α⇒ T2 < (1− α′)/(1− α)
These facts and the inequality from [6] that ∀x, y ≥ 0, xy ≤ exy/e show that the
incentive ratio is bounded by e1/e. The example in [6] for Fisher markets shows
the bound is tight.
This bound can be exceeded, even when m = 3, as the following example
shows.
Example 2 (Incentive ratio > e1/e). Suppose the market is as follows:


e1 = (.99, .01, .01)
e2 = (.01, .99, .99)
u1(x1) = x
.2
11x
.3
12x
.5
13
u2(x2) = x
.4
21x
.6
12
u′1(x
′
1) = x
′
11
.85
x′12
.1
x′13
.05
then


p = (.398, .597, .201)
x1 ≈ (.202, .202, 1)
u1(x1) ≈ .4495
p′ = (.4045, .1344, .0201)
x′1 ≈ (.845, .299, 1)
u1(x
′
1) ≈ .6731
Therefore the incentive ratio is approximately 1.50; a tight bound remains an
open question.
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The remainder of this section is devoted to the proof that the incentive
ratio for Cobb–Douglas markets is bounded. We will use that, by the AM–GM
inequality,
m∏
j=1
(
α′ij
αij
p′ · ei
p · ei
pj
p′j
)αij
≤
m∑
j=1
p′ · ei
p · ei maxα′i
α′ij
p′j
max
αi
pj
and then try to bound the j − th term in this sum by choosing a particular
normalisation for p, p′. The following proposition contains three parts: first,
it shows that pj attains its maximum at αi = (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0) where the 1 is
the j − th element in the vector; second α′ij/p′j also attains its maximum at
α′i = αi = (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0). Finally, the budgets p · ei and p′ · ei are equal for
any choice of αi, α
′
i.
Proposition 3. i) Normalise pj = 1, then pj(αi) reaches its maximum
when αij = 1 and αik = 0 for all k 6= j.
ii) Normalise p′j = 1, then α
′
ij/p
′
j(α
′
i) reaches its maximum when α
′
ij = 1 and
α′ik = 0 for all k 6= j.
iii) Let A be the “exponents matrix” i.e. it contains the strategies for each
player in such a way that column i ∈ [n] contains αi and so A is an
m×n matrix. Similarly, E is the “endowment matrix”, where columns are
indexed by agents and rows by commodities, so that it is m× n. Consider
the matrices EAT −Im and E(A′)T −Im and their adjugates, Adj(EAT −
Im) and Adj(E(A
′)T −Im) respectively. Then the first row of the adjugate
matrices contains the equilibrium price vectors p and p′ (upto a nonzero
constant) and moreover, p · ei = p′ · ei.
Proof. For the first two points in the proof, without loss of generality we consider
the case where j = m i.e. pm = 1.
i) Let p(α) be the equilibrium price when players report strategies according
to α = (α1, . . . , αn). We can see a strategy as follows: αij = αij/
∑m
k=1 αik
for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m] i.e. we transform the explicit constraint to an implicit
one. Next, let pˆ and αˆi be vectors with (the first) m − 1 components and zˆ is
the excess demand function for the first m − 1 commodities. By the implicit
function theorem
Dαˆim pˆ(α) = − [Dpˆzˆ(p(α);α)]−1Dαˆim zˆ(p(α);α)
By Proposition 17.G.3 in [9], [Dpˆzˆ(p(s);α)]
−1
has all its entries negative.
Dαˆim zˆ(p(α);α) is a negative vector, this completes the proof.
ii) Immediate.
iii) We now choose a particular normalisation for p and show that we have
p · ei = p′ · ei. We apply an argument along the lines of [12]. First, notice that
an equilibrium price vector p satisfies (see [8])
pT (EAT − Im) = 0
We have, where ejαk is a shorthand notation for
∑n
i=1 eijαik,
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EAT − Im =


e1α1 − 1 e1α2 . . . e1αm
e2α1 e2α2 − 1 . . . e2αm
...
...
. . .
...
emα1 emα2 . . . emαm − 1


As argued in [12], the rows of Adj(EAT −Im) are proportional to p. We only
need to make sure that the “proportionality factor” c is not 0. The (1, j)− th
entry of Adj(EAT − Im) is what we get when we compute the determinant of
the matrix that we get when removing the first column and j − th row from
EAT−Im if j is odd and −1 times this determinant when j is even. For example,
for p1, because of the assumption,∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
e2α2 − 1 e2α3 . . . e2αm
e3α2 e3α3 − 1 . . . e3αm
...
...
. . .
...
emα2 emα3 . . . emαm − 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
is a (strictly) diagonal matrix and therefore, nonsingular by the Levy–
Desplanques theorem. This shows that the above determinant is nonzero and
so, up to the sign, the equilibrium price of commodity 1, p1. Therefore c 6= 0
and we conclude that up to a (possibly negative) scalar, we have the equilibrium
price p in the first row of Adj(EAT − Im).
We note that, instead of computing equilibrium prices, we could just com-
pute p·ei directly by replacing the first column in EAT−Im by ei and computing
the determinant (with respect to the first column) of the resulting matrix:
p · ei = 1
c
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ei1 e1α2 . . . e1αm
ei2 e2α2 − 1 . . . e2αm
...
...
. . .
...
eim emα2 . . . emαm − 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
We now prove the claim by noting that p · ei = p′ · ei if and only if this
property is true when we change just two entries in αi and leave the others
unchanged i.e. α′j = αj + δ and α
′
k = αk − δ for 0 ≤ δ ≤ αk for j, k ∈ [m], j 6= k
and α′r = αr for all r ∈ [m]\{j, k}.
We distinguish two cases depending on whether 1 ∈ {j, k}. First suppose
that j = 1 and without loss of generality assume k = 2. Let δ be the vector
with zeroes except at position i where it equals δ. Then we have
p′ · ei =1
c
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ei1 e1(α2 − δ) . . . e1αm
ei2 e2(α2 − δ)− 1 . . . e2αm
...
...
. . .
...
eim em(α2 − δ) . . . emαm − 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
c


∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ei1 e1α2 . . . e1αm
ei2 e2α2 − 1 . . . e2αm
...
...
. . .
...
eim emα2 . . . emαm − 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ei1 −δei1 . . . e1αm
ei2 −δei2 . . . e2αm
...
...
. . .
...
eim −δeim . . . emαm − 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣


=p · ei
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and the conclusion follows; the case where j, k 6= 1 is similar: adding up columns
j, k in the expression for the determinant does not change the value of p · ei and
p′ ·ei and after that we can compute the determinant by splitting it as above.
Theorem 1. The incentive ratio for Cobb–Douglas markets is at most m.
Proof. By the results presented in Proposition 3,
ui(x
′
i)
ui(xi)
=
m∏
j=1
(
α′ij
αij
p′ · ei
p · ei
pj
p′j
)αij
≤
m∏
j=1
(
1
αij
p′ · ei
p · ei maxα′i
α′ij
p′j
max
αi
pj
)αij
≤
m∏
j=1
(
1
αij
)αij
≤ m,
where the last step follows from the weighted AM–GM inequality.
Before concluding, we summarize the results presented here in Table 1.
Table 1: Upper bounds on the incentive ratio in n × m exchange economies.
The bounds for Fisher markets come from [7], [6].
Market Fisher Exchange
Leontief 2 ∞
Linear 2 ∞
Cobb–Douglas (Without Assumption 1, n = 2, m = 2) e1/e ∞
Cobb–Douglas (With Assumption 1, any n, m = 2) e1/e e1/e
Cobb–Douglas (With Assumption 1, any n, m ≥ 3) e1/e m
4 Conclusion
This paper surveyed the concept of incentive ratio in the much more general
model of exchange economies as compared to Fisher markets. Results in Fisher
markets were encouraging: the maximum gains from strategic behaviour were
bounded by reasonably small constants and therefore equilibrium mechanisms
could be expected to work rather well, meaning that the profits from (compu-
tationally challenging) strategic behaviour were small relative to the costs, and
thus, not worthwhile on most occassions. In other words, the equilibrium mech-
anism in Fisher markets is quite robust against strategic behaviour. However,
the results here indicate that in the more general setup of exchange economies,
results are diametrically different and without further restrictions, ratios in lin-
ear, Leontief and Cobb–Douglas markets are unbounded.
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